World Should Not Pin its Hopes on Rafsanjani

Ray Takeyh, The Financial Times:

As they gather on Wednesday in Geneva, foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany, the so-called EU3 which is negotiating with Iran over its nuclear programme, are intent on deterring an increasingly intransigent Tehran from resuming its nuclear enrichment activities. Shielding itself behind the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Iran claims it has an "inalienable" right to complete the fuel cycle, granting it an enhanced nuclear capacity that potentially could be exploited for military purposes.

In their frustration, the European diplomats are looking to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the wily politician and recently declared Iranian presidential candidate, as a potential saviour. Should the nuclear talks stretch past Iran's June 17 presidential contest, they hope a newly inaugurated Mr Rafsanjani will quickly resolve the nuclear stalemate. However, in their euphoric embrace of Mr Rafsanjani, the Europeans neglect both Iran's recent history and its political peculiarities.

Contrary to the popular images of Mr Rafsanjani as the only politician who can transcend Iran's factionalised politics and produce results, his previous tenure as president was far from successful. READ MORE

When he assumed the presidency in 1989, Mr Rafsanjani was perceptive enough to recognise that Iranians, after a prolonged war, needed tangible economic rewards and a relaxation of onerous Islamic cultural strictures.

However, after eight years in office, Mr Rafsanjani had neither liberalised Iran's economy nor resolved its inherent distortions. Government borrowing from international markets left Iran saddled with a huge debt burden while state subsidies curbed growth rates. High unemployment and inflation plagued the economy. Culturally, Iran remained a largely repressive society laden with religious impositions.

Neither did the Rafsanjani presidency usher in a foreign policy of moderation and pragmatism. To be sure, after the prolonged Iran-Iraq war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's foreign policy was bound to change, with national interest calculations eclipsing ideological convictions.

Despite a modest rapprochement with the Gulf sheikhdoms, however, Mr Rafsanjani could not develop a consensus behind mending fences with the US or normalising relations with the European community. On issues of terrorism and the Arab-Israeli peace process, Iran remained implacable and dogmatic. Revisionist accounts notwithstanding, it was Mohammad Khatami, the much-maligned reformist president, who did much to reorient Iran's international relations and achieve a reconciliation with key states such as Saudi Arabia and European countries.

That is not to suggest Mr Rafsanjani is not a pragmatist; historically, a mixture of realism and self-interest has driven him toward moderation. As an architect of the Islamic republic, and at the end of his long career, he feels compelled to come to the forefront once more and rescue Iran from its predicament.

In a sense, both Mr Rafsanjani and Mr Khatami are victims of a constitutional order that gives essential power to unelected hardliners. It is the unelected institutions such as the Supreme Leader, the Council of Guardians and the judiciary that have the ultimate authority over national affairs. Yet the Islamic republic also sanctioned the populace to elect the president and parliament. The tension between revolutionaries unaccountable to the collective will and elected politicians has produced a stalemate that no single politician can easily resolve.

In his quest to change Iran, Mr Rafsanjani faces even more formidable obstacles. Over the past few years, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, has consolidated his power over Iran's key institutions, placing like-minded hardliners in important posts.

Moreover, the younger generation of conservatives, many of whom covet the presidency themselves, resent not just Mr Rafsanjani's pragmatism but also his opportunism in terms of seeking yet another presidential term and thus denying them the opportunity.

In a strange twist, Mr Rafsanjani's candidacy has generated more optimism in western capitals than on Iran's streets. Since the failure of the popular reform movement, Iranians have become disenchanted with the political process, viewing the Islamic polity as incapable of responding to its constituency. International pressure, popular apathy and hardliners' hostility greet Mr Rafsanjani's candidacy. Should he triumph, he may well regret his original decision to run.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

It is encouraging to see the mainstream media finally wake up to who Rafsanjani is. Earlier today the NY Times has a similar report. Rafsanjani is not the"saviour" he has been trying to appear. The next step is for the mainstream media to begin to discuss the real solution for Iran, replacing the present government with a real democracy. This is what most Iranians long for.