Known and unknown in Iran

Eran Lerman, YNet News:

At the height of the Cold War, British singer and songwriter Sting wondered aloud, "How can I save my little boy from Oppenheimer's deadly toy"?

The question was a bit unfair: Toys were the last thing on "Oppie's" mind as he and his team raced Hitler and Tojo to the bomb in 1944-1945.

But Sting's next line -"...believe me when I say to you/ I hope the Russians love their children too" was more accurate, and adequately portrayed all the fear and uncertainty of those trying times.

But if the present regime in Iran produces a nuclear bomb, will this pious hope be enough to keep our children (and theirs) safe? When speaking of the people, Russians or Persians, it is easy to argue (as Sting did) that "We share the same biology/ regardless of ideology".

But there is little in the words or actions of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameni or President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, both of whom openly and consistently advocate Israel's speedy destruction, to suggest this might be the case. READ MORE

As Hizbullah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, their agents in the Palestinian context, seek to draw us to the brink of large-scale violence, we have a taste of what things might be like if we come to live with the fact of an Iranian "Revolutionary Islamic" bomb.

Meanwhile, we are facing, in fact, three interlocking and agonizing uncertainties as to the dynamics driving the Iranian nuclear project. It would be easy, but wrong, to scoff at the difficulty of making life-and-death decisions under these circumstances, and informed decision-making in recent months has become harder, not easier. There are several reasons for this.

What we know, what we don't

For starters, we know what we know about the Iranian project (to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld's famous tongue-twister); and we know some of what we do not know – but might get to know, if we focus our intelligence collection and the world's inspection efforts on it.

Within this realm of knowledge, the common judgment is that we still have time – a few years? – before Iran's nuclear program matures to the point of producing a nuclear weapon.

There is some reason to suspect, however, that on the "we don't know" side there may be elements and aspects that potentially inhibit any forceful action (lest we wake up the day after and find that we went after the overt project, only to find the core capacity lies elsewhere).

Reacting to international pressure

The second tier of uncertainty has to do with the reactions of the present regime towards growing international pressure – and possibly, sanctions.

Will Iran continue to play the defiant, heroic challenger of the "Western" (not to mention "Zionist") world order – or will they offer real gestures "in money time", significantly delaying the project for fear of provoking a general conflict?

The third and most fascinating question has to do with how simple people in Iran may respond to forceful and even direct military action, if it is ever undertaken: Will patriotic Iranians "rally round the flag", and defend the regime against all comers – or will a diplomatic and military humiliation break the mullahs' hold?

As waves of change sweep through the region, this becomes (in numerous local varieties) the most pertinent question: everybody would be happy with regime change in Iran, but few have given real thought as to how to bring this about.

Agonies of uncertainty

These agonies of uncertainty are, moreover, compounded (some would say simplified) by one dominant certainty; that the world will not be not safe if the current regime in Iran ends up with a nuclear bomb. This may not be true if a liberal, Persian nation-state were to replace the Islamic Republic.

Israel is already taking measures, enhancing the IDF's capacity to shoot down incoming "Shihab III" missiles, and hinting heavily that the two new submarines purchased in Germany would add to Israel's deterrent posture. But as some defense intellectuals argue, these extremely costly measures could also turn out to be a massive case of overreaction, undermining the regional balance.

This call needs to be made. The time for decisions, hard as they may be given the imponderables listed above, may come soon.

It is worth noting that Shimon Peres, upon his decision to leave the Labor Party, used the Iranian nuclear issue to demonstrate that the time has not yet come for Israeli leaders to turn their attentions solely to social issues.

The argument serves Peres' present purpose. It also happens to be true.

Dr. Eran Lerman, a former IDF intelligence senior official, is the executive director of the American Jewish Committee (AJC)