Analysis: How could Iran vote be like?

Modher Amin, UPI, Washington Times:

Iranians will go to the polls in June -- for the ninth time since the establishment of the Islamic Republic 26 years ago -- amidst widespread speculation that, due to voter apathy and disenchantment, the right wing may win the presidency by default. This would be a repeat of their success in general elections last year and local elections one year earlier.

In the March 2003 city-council elections, the turnout was very low, about 20 percent in big cities and as low as 12 percent in Tehran, where reformists had swept the board in 1999. READ MORE

Likewise, in Feb. 2004, a record low turnout of 50 percent -- 17 percent lower than the previous elections in 2000 -- was recorded. In the capital, the figure was as low as 28 percent, although in small constituencies in the provinces, up to 70 percent of participation was reported.

Many observers have seen this as an indication of growing frustration with the apparent inability of the reform movement to bring about change in the face of resistance from the conservative establishment.

Iran's political system combines elements of modern Islamic theocracy with democracy. The whole system operates under a supreme leader (the Vali-e Faqih) who, although appointed by an elected body, is answerable to no one.

The constitution, however, recognizes the popular will, creating a system where the elected president and parliament struggle against the more powerful, but un-elected, institutions the supreme leader influences. Consequently, although reformists have been holding the executive position for the last eight years with the parliament in their control for half this period, the political system has failed to see the expected changes.

The reformists, led by the massively elected President Mohammad Khatami, argue that ultimate sovereignty lies with the people, and that the entire political establishment -- including the supreme leadership -- should be responsive, transparent and accountable to the electorate.

While the reformists accept in principle the concept of Velayat-e Faqih (the Rule of the Jurisprudent) which is one of the pillars of the Iranian Islamic regime, many of them would prefer the role of the supreme leader to be advisory, almost papal, rather than political, intrusive, and engaged with the levers of temporal power.

By contrast, most conservatives, and certainly the hard-liners, believe that the Vali-e Faqih has a kind of divinely bestowed authority which makes his intervention, on any issue he chooses, decisive and unchallengeable.

The Khatami era, coming to an end in a few months' time, was clearly marred by a political civil war, in which reformers fought for the rule of law, a civil society, and the marriage of democracy and Islam.

Not long after Khatami's landslide victory in May 1997 -- when the mid-ranking charismatic cleric secured some 80 percent of votes to become the fifth president of the Islamic republic -- powerful hard-liners began striking back, using their two major strongholds, the Judiciary and the Council of Guardians, as a springboard.

The courts launched a concerted campaign against liberal figures and journalists, and closed down dozens of pro-reform publications.

Meanwhile, the Council of Guardians, a constitutional watchdog that vets election candidates and vetoes legislation, used its powers to block reformist bills of any significance. In parliamentary elections in Feb. 2004, the council barred some 2500 reformist candidates, including more than 80 lawmakers, from standing in the elections.

On why Khatami was elected on a landslide eight years ago, a leading political analyst and university professor, Sadeq Ziba-Kalam, once put it this way: "... The main reason for the victory of the pro-reform president in 1997 was that the people simply did not want the opposite side, namely the fundamentalists."

"In 1997, only a few people were of the view that Khatami and the fundamentalists are in the same boat. But now the number of those believing so has risen drastically," he said.

Reform candidates for the coming presidential election -- among them the mid-ranking cleric and former speaker Mehdi Karroubi and the ex-minister of Higher Education Mostafa Mo'een -- are surely less charismatic than Khatami.

Hard-liners, on the other hand, after weeks of bickering over whom to nominate as their candidate, have chosen Ali Larijani, former head of state broadcast and now security advisor to the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Larijani's nomination, however, has not prevented other hopefuls from the same political faction to be in the lineup.

The son of a senior ayatollah and a former officer of the Revolutionary Guards -- or Pasdaran in Persian -- Larijani is the director of a think tank that advises the leader on important, complicated and complex international issues. He is said to have the credit of having urged Khamenei to authorize the signing, in Oct. 2003, of the controversial additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The act is believed to have helped his country escape possible international sanctions that could have been decided by the United Nations Security Council in the event that Tehran did not bow to the demands of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency. ...

But the fear of a hard-line victory may prompt an unexpected alliance between reformists and moderate conservatives to back the former president (1989-1977) and chairman of the powerful Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Being known as a center of political gravity since the 1979 Islamic revolution and as a figure strong enough to tackle hardliners, Rafsanjani, 70, has yet to state officially he will stand in June's presidential elections, though he said last month he was "completely ready" to run if no other "capable and popular person is found."

Earlier this week, he said he felt he had to "swallow the bitter pill" of contesting for the sake of the country and to prevent a low turnout because the other candidates were not well known or experienced. But on Thursday, he was quoted as saying that he had still not decided whether to run for election again.

"I have no desire to stand; I wish that someone else would take this responsibility, but if I see things are not going the way I want, I will stand," he said, according to the official Islamic Republic News Agency.

Moreover, Rafsanjani is widely seen as Iran's de facto number-two behind the supreme leader in recent years. He has nevertheless managed to keep a distance from tensions between reformists and hardliners and to acquire an image of a conservative-leaning pragmatist.

Nominations are not due until mid-May, but campaigning has, in a sense, already begun with several candidates holding news conferences to explain their agendas.
Some opinion polls conducted so far indicate that public participation could be between 42 and 51 percent, however lower than the average 64 percent in the past eight presidential races.

Another contender in the race who has added to the uncertainties surrounding the elections is the popular former police chief, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf.
Having resigned his job recently to participate in the election, Qalibaf, 44, has a Ph.D. in political geography. Eight years ago, he was appointed commander of police.
On the impact of his decision on future developments, he told the media earlier this month that he was a fundamentalist, "but not affiliated to any political factions."
"I believe I should not become indebted to any particular group.... In the ideology of fundamentalism, national interests take precedence over collective interests and even personal gains."

Asked whether the atmosphere of the country would become militaristic if he were elected chief executive, he said, "The presence of people with military backgrounds (as chief executive) has been experienced in advanced and modern countries. I consider being an officer a dignified profession, but I do not consider myself a military man."

"If I wanted to create a militaristic atmosphere, the police department was the best choice. Most of my complaints during my tenure in the police department were that I gave more importance to sociological aspects than militaristic considerations," Qalibaf added.

Though the military is barred by the constitution from political activities, their participation in elections has no constitutional limitation on condition that they have got out of the ranks in due time, according to Iranian lawyers.

After a long struggle between hard-line conservatives unwilling to trim their absolute power and reformers, there are signs that a gradual political change is underway in Iran. Most analysts share the view that conservatives also have been taking on elements of the reform agenda by showing a new pragmatism on both domestic and international scenes.

While the article provides a introduction to Iran's political process, it is either deceptive or naive. The writer appears to want us to believe that the new conservatives, consolidating their power in Iran will be more "pragmatic."

The writer rightly pointed out how the Iranian people thought that Khatami would produce real reforms, "In 1997, only a few people were of the view that Khatami and the fundamentalists are in the same boat." But the writer is making the same error that the Iranian people made back in 1997.

Rafsanjani is now being repackaged to be seen as a moderate, because of his more "pragmatic" approach. But while he occasionally makes "moderate" statements, he also makes extreme "hardline" statements. The Iranians often speak out of both sides of their mouth as it confuses the western press. But we need to remember that Rafsanjani has been the "number two man" of the regime, many believe he is in reality the real power behind the policies of the regime. Western support for Rafsanjani will not find the moderate they hope for, instead it will provide Iran with what it wants most, time.