New Iran Nuclear Crisis Looms

Daniel Dombey, The Financial Times:

It's summertime in much of the world right now — and if past experience means anything there will soon be a crisis over Iran's nuclear programme. This time things are much more serious than before. Relations between Tehran and the West are looking distinctly overcast in the wake of the presidential election victory of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad. READ MORE

But there are also deeper rooted reasons for the looming clash, which could lead to United Nations action against Iran, splits among Europe's biggest powers, and sabre-rattling (at the very least) in the US.

Just look back at the last couple of summers, both of which presaged stormy weather ahead.

In June 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran had failed to come clean about its nuclear activities, which other countries feared were aimed at producing nuclear weapons. Tensions increased, with the US refusing to rule out military action, until October when French, German and British foreign ministers reached a deal with Tehran.

In July 2004 the deal fell apart as Iran started making parts for centrifuges that could be used to produce weapons grade uranium. Tehran later announced it had also started producing feedstocks for the nuclear cycle, while the "EU3" countries warned that unless Iran curtailed all such activities they would back calls to refer it to the UN security council.

That year's crisis came to an end in Paris in November when a new, tougher agreement between the EU3 and Tehran curtailed all Iranian activities linked to uranium enrichment for the duration of negotiations on the long term future of the nuclear programme.

The Europeans said they were looking for "objective guarantees" that Iran would not use nuclear technology to develop the bomb. In return they said they would help Tehran with technology, forge closer economic links, particularly trade, and even address the country's security concerns.

But the Europeans added that, given Tehran's history of subterfuge and concealment, the objective guarantees they were seeking were, in effect, the dismantlement of the entire Iranian infrastructure for uranium enrichment — the process that can produce both nuclear fuel and nuclear bombs.

Iran has consistently maintained it has a right to enrich uranium, which it says it needs to bolster its energy security (despite its reserves of oil and gas) and that it has no intention of giving it up. The country has always insisted its nuclear programme is wholly peaceful.

That difference in views has set the stage for the breakdown in negotiations that European diplomats now widely expect this summer. Indeed it was a triumph of European diplomacy, with behind the scenes US support, that a Geneva meeting in May managed to delay the denouement until after Iran's presidential elections.

The Europeans have promised to deliver a new package of proposals to the Iranians by early August — the betting is that they will now do so just after Mr Ahmadi-Nejad's inauguration. Next to no one can conceive of how they can come up with anything that Tehran will accept.

The EU will offer fuel guarantees to allay any Iranian need for enriched uranium, deeper economic links and a security dialogue to make Iran, a country traditionally bordered by enemies, feel more at peace in the world. But it is hard to see how any of it will make any difference, given Tehran’s consistent message on uranium enrichment and the widespread perception in European capitals that Iran's real desire is to be within arm's reach of nuclear capacity.

As a result European minds are turning to security council resolutions. The EU3 have already told the US that they would support a referral to the UN if Iran resumes its nuclear programme.

But there are at least three problems.

First, the EU3 themselves may not be united on vigorous action against Tehran — after all, Germany and France are by some counts the two biggest foreign investors in the country.

Second, any issue would have to be discussed at the IAEA, the UN's nuclear watchdog, before being referred to New York — and the fate of a hostile resolution put to the IAEA's 35-member board of governors is far from certain. And third, China is developing ever closer ties with Iran and may veto any UN vote.

So any initial stab at a UN resolution is likely to be diplomatically worded so that it can be agreed on by the EU3, make it through the IAEA and not be vetoed by Beijing. As a result, it is only likely to call on Iran to respect the Paris agreement. A later resolution, if things got that far, might seek to turn the Paris agreement into international law by denying Iran the right to enrich uranium. Any attempt to impose sanctions would be much further down the line.

The Europeans also hope that by winning over Moscow to their cause — Russia, as a neighbour of Iran's, has no interest in seeing a nuclear-armed Tehran — they will create a critical mass in favour of a resolution. With all four other permanent members of the UN security council agreed on a relatively inoffensive resolution, it may be difficult for China to wield its veto.

But just as the Europeans are seeking to deal with the imminent clash by drafting relatively soft resolutions, Iran is likely to try to defuse such a confrontation by resuming nuclear activity in a patchy and low-profile way. Tehran knows that if it starts its entire nuclear programme up again at one blow a security council resolution is more likely; as a result it is likely to resume the programme in dribs and drabs.

All of which means that the next few months are profoundly uncertain. European unity may prevail and bring a UN resolution in its wake. But there is also a risk that, even though the talks fail, the UN process will ground to a halt, which will be good news for two groups of people — the champions of Iran's nuclear programme and the partisans of an airstrike against Tehran.

This summer looks like it will be hot. But after that things could get even stickier.