Iran: U.S., Israel Rethink Their Strategies

Stratfor:

U.N. nuclear watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei on Dec. 6 expressed optimism that the controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear program would be resolved by next year. ElBaradei's comments, together with a host of other recent developments, point to a growing consensus within the international community acknowledging that Iran will have access to nuclear technology. This emerging scenario has forced the United States to consider options other than a referral to the U.N. Security Council, and Israel to seek means other than military strikes to contain Iran. READ MORE

Analysis

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Dec. 6 that he hopes to resolve all outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program by next year. He also hailed Russia's efforts to help resolve the row over uranium enrichment. Russian President Vladimir Putin said the IAEA has not yet exhausted all its options to negotiate a settlement on the Iranian nuclear issue, and offered Russian mediation between Iran and the West.

These remarks came on the heels of statements from Iran's Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, who said Dec. 5, "We don't have problems with having enrichment [both] in Iran and other countries." Meanwhile, Israel recently indicated that it might be looking at options besides pre-emptive military strikes as deterrence. Also, U.S. officials recently began avoiding any mention of the _military option_ and instead openly declared Washington's need for Tehran's help regarding an exit strategy in Iraq.

That Iran is not backing down while the world's major players push ahead to engage Tehran diplomatically clearly underscores the international community's implicit acknowledgment that it is willing to allow Tehran to have access to nuclear technology. But this is the extent of the consensus; there is no consensus on how to act on this concept.

The United States and its allies also realize they do not have an effective means of preventing Iran from weaponizing the technology -- which has forced them to explore other options to thwart Iran's potential aggressive pursuit of its geopolitical objectives in the event that it manages to fashion a nuclear weapon. This would explain why U.S. President George W. Bush's administration, while still mentioning the possibility of referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), is willing to allow Russia -- not a traditional U.S. ally -- to oversee Iran's nuclear development.

Similarly, Israeli officials saying they might have to live with a nuclear Iran shows that they realize there are limits to how far they can push the threat of airstrikes against Iranian nuclear sites. Although it is capable of a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, Israel is considering the option of enhancing its own nuclear and conventional capabilities, which could serve as a deterrent to Iran. This would be the logical course of action, given that Israel seems to acknowledge that Iran will become a nuclear power. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government has been trying to beef up its conventional military capabilities -- such as missile technology -- that supplement its undeclared nuclear capabilities.

The issue of Iran's nuclear program has been complicated by the growing number of players in the negotiating process along with the interests and limitations of each of these actors. As a result, the simplistic options -- UNSC referral and/or military strikes -- are becoming increasingly unrealistic and forcing Washington and its allies to search for complex and creative means to constrain Tehran. To avoid either a UNSC referral or military strikes, Iran has exploited U.S. interests in Iraq, Russian interests in countering the U.S. geopolitical offensive in the former Soviet Union, the divisions within the European Union, the IAEA's role in furthering negotiations, and Israeli concerns over Iranian nuclear ambitions.

We have on several occasions said that Iran is using the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip to help secure regime continuity via international (and especially U.S.) recognition, and we also have said that Iran ultimately wants nuclear weapons because recognition might not guarantee the clerical regime's survival. The unelected clerics at the apex of Iran's political system fear that with recognition comes proximity -- which could lead to their unseating. This would explain why the Iranians have adopted an ambiguous stand on Washington's offer to hold direct public talks on Iraq: Tehran feels that Washington could take advantage of full bilateral relations with Iran and try to engineer democratic coups. However, from Tehran's point of view, if it had nuclear weapons it would need only accommodation with Washington. Thus, the ruling clerics' preferred route is limited isolation from the United States along with nuclear weapons.