Statfor's Interpretation of the Khalilzad Initiative

Statfor: Hat tip, Alphabet City

U.S. President George W. Bush made his speech. It was fascinating in two respects. On the surface, he held hard to the basic theme that he has stayed with for the past two years: that the primary path forward rests on a military solution to the insurgency. When looked at a bit deeper, it was a much more nuanced speech than he normally makes. READ MORE

The main theme was that the primary solution to the American problem in Iraq is turning over responsibility for security and prosecution of the war against the insurgents to an Iraqi army. A good deal of the speech was devoted to a discussion of the process of training the Iraqi army and the lessons that have been learned in the process of doing so.

What was important here was the implication that the variable determining U.S. participation in Iraq is not the state of the insurgency, but the state of the Iraqi army. At one point he said this war would not end with a ceremony on the deck of a battleship. In other words, there will not be a sudden, formal end to the war.

He has therefore divided the war into two parts. The first is the phase in which the United States carried the primary responsibility of defeating the insurrection. The second phase would be the one in which the Iraqi army carries the primary burden. For the United States, the war could be reduced or ended prior to a complete defeat of the insurgents.

The more interesting dimension of the speech was his careful parsing of the insurgency. First, he identified the insurgency as Sunni. Then, he divided the insurgents into three groups:

1. Rejectionists: Those Sunnis who reject an Iraq in which they no longer hold a privileged position.

2. Saddamites: Those who want to return the dictatorship to power.

3. Terrorists: People around militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who are committed to continuing the struggle at all costs.

He went on to say that, "We're working with the Iraqis to help them engage those who can be persuaded to join the new Iraq -- and to marginalize those who never will." And that is the heart of the strategy.

What Bush said in this line is that it is the Iraqis themselves -- or more precisely, Shia and Kurds in the political process, as well as Sunnis -- who already are engaged in finding a political solution. Bush has named two groups that are beyond the pale (Saddamites -- you have to love that name -- and terrorists) and one group, the rejectionists, that is in play. Bush said he wants to isolate the insurgents by engaging those who will engage. That obviously means the rejectionists.

The rejectionists' requirements are purely political. This group is interested in its own role in Iraq, not in restoring Saddam Hussein or in supporting foreign jihadists. If its members can be induced to stop fighting and isolate the other two groups, some sort of stability can be achieved. This requires a political process. Note that Bush said that the Iraqis would carry out the political process with U.S. assistance. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad said he was going to engage in negotiations with them himself, as well as with the Iranians. If what Bush said is taken seriously, that means the United States, in negotiating on behalf of and in support of the Iraqi government, is doing so from the Shiite platform. In other words, the rejectionists are being threatened with their worst nightmare -- complete marginalization under Shiite rule.

If this appears to be reading much into the speech, it may be. But if we assume that Khalilzad did not make his statements earlier in the week without authorization -- and he certainly did not -- then this speech has to be read in the context of Khalilzad's statements. And the only way that makes sense is to read Bush's analysis of the insurgency as a broad blueprint of the negotiating terrain.

Interestingly, he did not mention negotiations. He seemed to be speaking purely in military terms. Yet, at a crucial point, he drew a complex map of the enemy, and located the group that would be engaged and on whose behalf this would happen. In other words, Bush confirmed Khalilzad's statement without even slightly seeming to change U.S. strategy.

But by midweek we know this: The United States no longer expects to suppress the insurgency by itself, but expects to transfer responsibility to an Iraqi -- read Shiite and Kurdish -- force. It does not intend to isolate the insurgents, but to engage and divide them. And that means a purely military strategy will now be supplemented by negotiations. Bush never once mentioned Khalilzad. He never once said anything that undermined his position.

But so much for our dubious sources. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was right there, being praised again.