'Iran Declined'

The Wall Street Journal:

As page-turners go, the publications of the International Atomic Energy Agency don't exactly compete with "The Da Vinci Code." But a forthcoming report by IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei on Iran's nuclear programs, to be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors next week and then by the U.N. Security Council, offers evidence of a cover-up as alarming as anything a pulp novelist could dream up. READ MORE

The report hasn't yet been formally released, but we've seen a copy. The stonewalling it exposes can be summed up in the words "Iran declined," which appear repeatedly. Thus, "Iran declined" to make the head of its Physics Research Center (PHRC) available for an interview with IAEA inspectors, despite evidence the PHRC is involved in Iran's clandestine nuclear programs. When the IAEA requested information about the PHRC's procurement of dual-use technologies such as dye lasers, "Iran declined to discuss this matter further."

When the IAEA sought information about Iranian tests "related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicles," Iran "declined to address" the subject. And when the IAEA sought a copy of a documented offer by a "foreign intermediary" of nuclear-centrifuge technology, "Iran . . . declined the Agency's request." That foreigner is now known to be rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.

As a result, writes Mr. ElBaradei with diplomatic understatement, the IAEA is not "in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran."

The U.N. nuclear chief adds that "this conclusion can be expected to take even longer in light of the undeclared nature of Iran's past nuclear program, and in particular because of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge enrichment program, the existence of a generic document related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components, and the lack of clarification about the role of the military in Iran's nuclear program, including . . . recent information available to the Agency concerning alleged weapons studies that could involve nuclear material."

And that's not all. The report notes "inconsistencies" between the information provided by Iran about its plutonium separation experiments and what the agency found in its own analyses of Iranian samples. This suggests Iran is pursuing a plutonium track to an atomic device. We also learn that Iran intends later this year to install 3,000 centrifuges at its enrichment facilities at Natanz, more than enough to produce the 45 lbs. of highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon.

The report also provides a glimpse of the cat-and-mouse tactics Iran has deployed to keep U.N. inspectors off-balance. Mr. ElBaradei acknowledges areas in which the Iranians have been generally cooperative with the IAEA. But those acknowledgments tend to come with the caveat that Iran has provided only partial information, which "awaits clarification."

Also awaiting clarification is the status of ongoing negotiations over a proposal to enrich Iranian uranium at Russian sites. Tehran has been careful to nurture these talks as a foil against prospective Security Council action. But as with its calibrated disclosures to the IAEA, Iran seems only to be playing the international community for time as it continues to develop its nuclear capabilities.

Eventually, the clock will run out. When it does, either the Iranians will have a nuclear weapon or somebody else -- Israel, the U.S., or the "international community" -- will have taken decisive action to stop them. Mr. ElBaradei's report has given policy makers fair warning of the choices before them.