The Iranian Example

Barry Rubin, The Jerusalem Post:

There are three potential futures for Arab countries: the Arab nationalist status quo, a pragmatic and moderate democracy, or radical Islamism. The recent election in Iran – a place which differs in many ways – tells a great deal about these alternatives. READ MORE

Saudi Arabia, a monarchy with a strong Islamist flavor, is quite different from Syria, a radical Arab nationalist regime ruled largely by the Alawite minority. Lebanon and Iraq are closer to democracy; Morocco is more of a traditionalist regime, and so on. Clearly, too, there can be various apparent hybrids, like a democratic state with Islamic parties. Nevertheless, the basic choice remains stark.

Despite 30 years of talk about Islamist takeovers and five or so years of debate about liberal democracy, every Arab state remains basically an Arab nationalist regime. The dominant ideology is that nationalism and the battle against the West and Israel – held to be the true culprits in all Arab problems – transcend differences over political reform, economic modernization, interest-group goals, better education and many other issues.

The emotional issues promoted by nationalism are manipulated in an inciteful manner. No matter how much some people may ridicule this system and privately point to its failure, public discourse remains dominated by the same themes that have prevailed for decades.

Five years after the turn of the century, however, no Islamist or liberal force is even close to overthrowing any existing Arab regime. While we assume that some day things will change, the existing system should not be underestimated.

IRAN HAS no Arab nationalism and not even any separate doctrine of Iranian nationalism. Moreover, in Iran, Islamism has been in power for a quarter-century. Has the system worked? As in Arab states, it depends on what you mean by "worked." Some people have benefited materially, others are happier living under this form of government. Like Arab regimes, the Islamist state has built a whole range of institutions, propaganda mechanisms and military forces to keep it in power. And a government that has remained in power despite the difficulties Teheran's regime has faced is certainly a success story of survival, the main goal in politics.

But, like Arab regimes, Iran's rulers have misgoverned. Their foreign adventures and ideology have not raised living standards or solved social problems. There is massive discontent. To some extent these failures have discredited Islamism as the solution and grown a democratic reform movement many times the size of its Arab counterparts. The reformers have won elections and one of their leaders became president.

Facing such a serious challenge, the Iranian regime counterattacked. It cracked down on reformers and tightened control over elections to ensure a victory for the status quo. Still, divisions among the democrats and their election boycott probably did more damage than the regime's own actions. In the end, five candidates for president – a tactically more moderate member of the Islamist establishment, two hard-liners, and two reformers – split the vote almost exactly evenly. Electoral cheating by the regime might have helped determine the outcome; but after a run-off, a hard-line regime supporter won.

The victor, Teheran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, emphasized populist issues and courted the poorest voters. The government thus succeeded in a remarkable political ploy: It created an Islamist "opposition" from its own ranks, mobilized popular support for a candidate who condemned the regime's own corruption and incompetence, and then put him in power. The reformers were outmaneuvered, and the regime reinforced. The most extreme elements in Iranian society now have their own man in office, though Supreme Guide Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will continue to dominate the regime and pull the strings.

WHAT LESSONS do events in Iran have for Arab politics? For one thing, they show the establishment's ability to reinvent itself and retain power despite all its shortcomings and public discontent with its policies. Arab regimes have long been doing this with the Islamist factor in their own societies.

On the one hand, they wrap themselves in the mantle of Islam to prove their own legitimacy and subvert support for liberal reform. On the other hand, they point to the radical Islamists as a threat justifying the existing dictatorship. Many people who might otherwise back comprehensive reforms support the status quo, fearing the alternative would be living in their own version of Iran. In countries facing radical Islamist terrorism, like Algeria and Saudi Arabia, deciding that the current rulers are the lesser of two evils is an enormous factor in keeping up support for the regimes.

In Syria, President Bashar Assad has made a pact with Islamists, helping them subvert neighboring Iraq and attack American forces there in exchange for his own regime being left alone. In Palestinian politics Yasser Arafat gave Hamas freedom to conduct his terror war against Israel.

Such strategies can backfire in future, with the Islamists becoming so strong they can seize power – though this has not happened yet. Even in Lebanon, while it is an improvement, the old establishment has now largely ridden back into power using the anti-Syria issue.

Imagine how the Soviet regime might have prolonged its life for 20 years or more by producing some bright young communist populist who revitalized the system.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center as well as editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs and Turkish Studies.