Iran Tests Washington's Limits

The Power and Interest News Report:

Iran's recent uncompromising stance over its nuclear research program testifies to Tehran's assessment that the United States does not have the leverage to prevent it from pursuing its aggressive nuclear policy. READ MORE

For instance, in late 2003 and in early 2004, when the policy of France, Germany and the United Kingdom did not support isolating Iran, Tehran attempted to work with the Europeans in order to provide them with the political ammunition to distance their policy from the more hard line one of the United States. However, in recent weeks, despite being isolated by the Europeans, the Iranians have continued down the path of controlling the nuclear fuel cycle, even in the face of being referred to the U.N. Security Council.

As PINR stated in March 2004, "Tehran agreed to the additional [N.P.T.] protocol not because it planned on giving up its uranium enrichment program, but because it considered signing the protocol to be the best available route toward that program." Indeed, since the start of the debate over Iran's nuclear research program, Tehran has refused to back down on its stance of controlling the nuclear fuel cycle. The strategy behind this desire is what PINR described in August 2003: "[Iran] can continue its research into peaceful nuclear energy all the while preparing for a possible day when it could quickly develop its first nuclear weapons and become a nuclear-armed state." By controlling the nuclear fuel cycle, Iran will be in a better position to add a military component to its nuclear energy program.

Until recently, Iran has been careful not to isolate itself from the international community. However, the difficulties encountered by the U.S. in Iraq have convinced Tehran that it is unlikely that Washington will take noteworthy military or even economic action against Iran. The U.S. military is overburdened by the ongoing insurgency in Iraq, making a realistic ground invasion of Iran improbable. While strategic air strikes are certainly an option, it is unlikely that such strikes would destroy completely Iran's nuclear research program. Furthermore, an actual attack on its facilities would probably hasten Iran's drive toward nuclear weapons, similar to the effect that Israel's 1981 strike on the Osirak reactor in Iraq had on Baghdad. Highlighting this strategic assessment, Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi was recently quoted by Iran's state-run Fars news agency as saying that "a military confrontation with Iran is impossible and unfeasible, and they [the West] are fully aware of it." [See: "Iran's Bid for Regional Power: Assets and Liabilities"]

Additionally, an attack on Iran could cause further instability in Iraq and in the region. In Iraq, Iran has influence over various Shi'a militias. It has been assessed that bomb making materials have moved from Iran into Iraq. Shi'a leader Moqtada al-Sadr -- who commands a sizeable militia, known as the Mehdi Army -- has already announced publicly that he would support Iran in case of a conflict with the U.S. Iran has even threatened publicly its ability to cause further instability in Iraq. For instance, Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, recently said, "If these countries [the United States and E.U.-3] use all their means...to put pressure on Iran, Iran will use its capacity in the region," insinuating Tehran's ability to control events in Iraq.

Even if the U.S. refrains from taking military action against Iran, it also faces problems with placing economic sanctions on the country. Because the bulk of Iran's income derives from its energy resources, effective sanctions will have to target Iran's energy exports. It cannot be expected that China will cease cooperation in the energy sphere with Iran, and it is also difficult to imagine the United States and the European Union moving ahead with an economic sanctions regime that also includes Iran's energy exports. Energy prices are already at very high levels, putting strain on the global economy. Economic sanctions on Iran would increase these prices, especially with all of the instability in the energy markets caused by the rhetoric from Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, the social unrest in Nigeria, the gas shutoff by Russia, the attacks on pipelines in Iraq and the recent Islamist attack on Saudi Arabia's oil facilities.

Therefore, the preceding factors explain why Tehran's current strategy is to push the limits of the United States over the nuclear issue. Tehran does not believe that Washington will take effective action against it, provided that Iran does not take any drastic steps that would provoke a mandatory response from the United States. Look for Iran to continue its current policy, buying as much time as possible to pursue its nuclear ambitions and move closer toward the technology and resources necessary to add a military dimension to its nuclear research program.