Monday, June 06, 2005

The Great Secret of the Russian Middle Eastern Policy

Michel Elbaz, AxisGlobe: Dangerous liaisons: covert ''love affair" between Russia and Hezbollah. READ MORE
Since the tragedy of 9/11, the President of the Russian Federation has never missed an opportunity to remind the Western world that his country was the first one to stage a war against global terrorism. Translated from the "Kremlin language" it meant fighting against the Chechens, who refuse to disarm themselves. Putin is definitely right in claiming that Russia's battle against them had started much earlier than the 9/11-terror attack took place. Revolt of the nations of North Caucasus opposing foreign occupation dates back to the end of the 18th century, even before Tsarist Russia finished conquering the region. Since then each and every uprising was quelled brutally accompanied by genocide and deportation of the local population. Every new generation of the North Caucasian people tried, in vain, to regain its freedom.

The same repeated itself during the nineties of the previous century. But then, the new players – Islamic extremist organizations from abroad, entered the scene. They decided to transform Chechnya, which managed to gain its independence, into their main bridgehead inside the collapsed Soviet Union. Putin, who rose to power against the background of the infiltration of Islamic militants to Daghestan, used the situation to declare that the Chechen liberation movement is an indivisible part of the global terrorist network. Foreign Islamic elements, which supported Chechnya, were put on the Russian terror list. But there was "not enough room" on this list for the rest of the terrorist organizations, which were not suspected of hostile activity against the Kremlin.

Furthermore, several of them earned Russian sympathy and were "honored" with Moscow's courting. This was Putin`s revival of the traditional Soviet policy. During the USSR era its leadership used to divide the international terrorists into categories; "freedom fighters" and "radical elements". The first served Moscow's geopolitical interests and received its support. The others, acting against the USSR, or declining to accept its sponsorship, were labeled "terrorists". Today Moscow's policies and methods are identical.

The pro-Iranian Hezbollah stands out among those who benefit from the Kremlin's support. Its fighters are guilty of murdering hundreds of American and French citizens in the eighties. During the previous decade its emissaries committed two huge terrorist acts in Argentina, killing almost 120 people. Today Hezbollah`s terrorists are fighting coalition forces in Iraq. Putin`s declarations about "Russia's uncompromising battle against international terrorism" are taking place simultaneously with the contacts of the Russian Ministry of foreign Affairs with the leaders of Hezbollah. Their emissaries in Russia recruit potential suicide bombers without restraint or opposition on behalf of the local authorities. They purchase arms in the areas of the ex-USSR, which are now under Russian control. Russian ex-military experts train militants of Hezbollah before they infiltrate Iraq.

Covert "love affair" – the full story, part I

The Imam asks for Russian help

The relations between Russia and the Shiite's religious leadership in Lebanon started to develop in the beginning of the seventies. The spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shia community, Imam Moussa Al-Sadr, visited Moscow in 1972 and asked Soviet authorities to issue humanitarian aid to his people.

At the same time cooperation between the Marxist factions of the PLO that were active in Lebanon and Soviet military intelligence – GRU, intensified greatly. Several soviet officers (speaking fluent Arabic) even visited Palestinian terrorist training camps in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon between 1972-1975. Using their connections in PLO they managed to establish contact with Iranian opposition members and radical Lebanese Shiite groups, which also were training in Palestinian camps at that time.
Later, these contacts between Shiite extremists and GRU officers, allowed access of the Soviet intelligence to the AMAL and the Hezbollah leaders. In the beginning of the eighties, after Al- Sadr`s disappearance (1978) Moscow established tight relations with Nabih Berri, following the strengthening of his position as AMAL`s leader. The head of the KGB branch in Beirut, Yuri Perfiliev, and GRU officers acting in Syria and Lebanon, conducted links with Berri. On the contrary, Hezbollah in the beginning tried to avoid any direct contact with Moscow representatives at that time. Its spiritual leaders even expressed hostility towards the USSR because of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and oppression of the Muslim nations in the Soviet Union.

In September 1985 Imad Mughnieh`s (the head of the special operations unit of Hezbollah) militants abducted four employees of the Russian Embassy in Beirut. In exchange for setting them free the abductors demanded to cease all Syrian Army actions against Hezbollah, FATAH, Sunni radicals and left wing militia bases in Beirut and Tripoli. Moscow accepted these terms and put pressure on Syria, stopping the fighting.

Concurrently, the head of the KGB in Beirut Perfiliev, using the sources of Walid Jumblatt`s intelligence services made a direct contact with Hezbollah`s spiritual leader Sheikh Muhammad Fadlallah. A day after they have met for the second time, three of the kidnapped employees of the Russian embassy were set free. The fourth one – a senior officer of the KGB, was murdered, but the main reason of his death was more in the power rivalry between the KGB and Soviet military intelligence in Lebanon and less in Hezbollah`s intentions to harm Soviet representatives. After that incident there was no substantial data on contacts between Moscow and Hezbollah for at least a decade. But, according to the testimony of GRU agent in Sweden Stig Berling, Soviet military intelligence continued to cooperate with terrorist organizations in Lebanon until 1993.

Azerbaijani Defense Minister's deputy and the head of the Azerbaijani secret service Department of operations (until April 2005) Taufik Babayev, claims that in 1994 the Russian intelligence SVR (ex-Foreign Department of the KGB in the Soviet era) tried to renew contacts with Hezbollah. Babayev was responsible for keeping an eye on Iranian activities directed against his country and Tehran's connections with Islamic extremist organizations.

According to Israeli sources Babayev discovered that at the end of 1994 the head of SVR, Evgeny Primakov, using his close relations with Syria and Iran, found a channel to contact Hezbollah.

By the way, the same Yuri Perfiliev, who managed relations with Fadlallah during the eighties, worked for the SVR in 1994.

Diplomats on a Secret Service

Primakov`s appointment to the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry in January, 1996, brought drastic changes in Moscow's foreign policy. The pro-western orientation of his predecessor gave way to the revival of traditional Soviet diplomacy. The main manifestation of the change was the process of rapprochement between Russia and the Arab world, India and Iran. Concurrently, Primakov continued to define the goals of the Russian intelligence services. His close confidant, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, was appointed to lead the SVR (Sluzhba Vnesnei Razvedki), and coordinated all actions with his patron throughout his tenure in the office. Primakov has continued nurturing all of the initiatives and projects that he started as head of the SVR. Several months after he had replaced the previous Foreign Minister, he started to seek contacts with Hezbollah. In December, 1997, the Russian ambassador to Israel, Michail Bogdanov, admitted during an interview that Moscow constantly keeps in touch with Sheikh Nasralla`s subordinates. According to him, the contacts are kept primarily through the Russian embassy in Beirut. Bogdanov noted: "our cooperation with the organization is meant to encourage restraint. Less then a month before this interview, Primakov had visited Beirut. While he was conducting official meetings with Lebanese government figures, his attendant, Viktor Posovaluk, secretly met with the leaders of Hezbollah, including its General Secretary's deputy, Naim Kassem. Later in Moscow, during his meeting with journalists, Posovaluk called Hezbollah a "national liberation organization".

He came back to Lebanon in May, 1998, and again unofficially met with Naim Kassem., Posovaluk was conducting the contacts with Hezbollah on behalf of the Russian Foreign Office until he died in the summer of 1999. All this time he was the Russian President's special envoy to the Middle East and a deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Incidentally, he also managed contacts with representatives of the Taliban.

After his death, several meetings between representatives of the Russian Foreign Office and Hezbollah took place in 2000-2001. During his conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon in November, 2003, President Putin admitted the existence of such contacts, but claimed that they were conducted solely for the sake of receiving information on three abducted Israeli soldiers.

Coming soon - the next part of the series:
  • Role of the official leaders of the Muslims of Russia in Moscow's relations with Hezbollah
  • Kremlin legitimizes Hezbollah`s actions
  • Hezbollah`s spiritual leader calls for Russian involvement in the Middle East