Chance for an Unlikely Peacemaker
Quentin Peel, The Financial Times:
On the same day last week that Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, Iran’s fundamentalist president, called for Israel to be “wiped off the map” at an anti-Zionist conference in Tehran, his first vice-president was attending a different sort of event in Moscow.This also has its own dangers. If Russia can get Iran to accept a joint venture agreement that requires Iran to let Russia enrich its uranium (a deal they are currently negotiating), it could provide Iran the time needed to secretly enrich it's own nuclear fuel. The free world must not permit this, as tempting as it will be for the Europeans.
Parviz Davudi was representing Iran for the first time as an observer at a meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), the fledgling association that binds Russia, China and four former Soviet republics of central Asia together to fight terrorism, boost border security and promote greater economic co-operation. The prime ministers of Pakistan and Mongolia and the foreign minister of India were also official observers.
Mr Ahmadi-Nejad’s inflammatory statement brought instant condemnation from the US and the European Union. It gave fuel to all those who want to isolate Iran for its attempts to build a nuclear industry and its suspected ambition of also acquiring nuclear weapons. It has reduced the level of communication with the west to a new low.
The Iranian president’s speech also sorely embarrassed Russia, the foreign minister of which, Sergei Lavrov, happened to be visiting Israel and immediately dismissed the comment as “unacceptable”. Yet the attendance of Iran at the SCO in Moscow shows that lines of communication eastwards are still very much open and could even be reinforced.
That fact could provide an excellent opportunity for Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, to present himself as a global statesman and mediator. READ MORE
It could equally become the cause of a return to old cold war lines of confrontation. Do Russia and China see the SCO as a useful tool to fill the regional security vacuum in central Asia or as an attempt to counter US interests? Some US commentators seem to fear it could turn into a rival military alliance to Nato. That seems far-fetched. But if India, Pakistan and Iran were to become full members, it would certainly give pause for thought in Washington. Iran may provide the test. There is no easy way out of the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme. The US refuses to talk to the Iranian regime and has long been pressing for some form of international sanctions via the United Nations Security Council. There is periodic sabre-rattling in Washington, hinting that military intervention might be contemplated, although that seems highly unlikely given the number of US troops bogged down in Iraq. The reality is that President George W. Bush does not have a clear policy at all.
The EU, in the shape of Britain, France and Germany, has attempted to cobble one together but the efforts have run into the sand. There has certainly been Iranian intransigence, aggravated since Mr Ahmadi-Nejad’s election. But the more fundamental problem is that while the EU-3 can offer commercial carrots to Iran, they cannot give the sort of security guarantees Tehran needs to persuade it not to go nuclear. From an Iranian perspective, the US is its greatest security threat and only the US can provide reassurance.
Russia is just as determined not to let Iran acquire nuclear weapons as the US and the EU-3. Not only is Iran a near neighbour; Mr Putin does not want a new wave of nuclear proliferation unleashed in the Gulf region, either.
On the other hand, Moscow sees Iran normally as a stabilising factor: a good ally against the Taliban in Afghanistan and against the spread of Sunni Islamist terrorism in central Asia. Iran has refrained from any criticism of Moscow in Chechnya. It is also a good commercial customer for the Russian nuclear industry, which urgently needs exports.
There is a possibility that the new Iranian government, by its sheer bloody-mindedness, will alienate even Mr Putin. But so far Russian policymakers are clear that they do not believe isolation and sanctions will help persuade Tehran to abandon any plans for N-weapons. They want to engage and say they understand Iran’s security concerns.
If Mr Putin is to be a peacemaker, it means raising his eyes from Russia’s “near abroad”, where his foreign policy has become badly entangled. He misread the outcome of the Rose Revolution in Georgia and then the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. He must fear the spread of such “colour revolutions”, not just through central Asia but even causing unrest in Russia itself. The Russian security forces are not just failing to bring peace to Chechnya, they are in danger of losing the entire north Caucasus region to a growing popular revolt. That is a dire distraction.
There is also a real temptation to go back to old cold war rivalry. Many in Moscow see western support for the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine as a deliberate anti-Russian strategy. Even Mr Putin blamed unnamed foreign powers for wanting to grab “juicy bits” of Russia after the Beslan terrorist tragedy. Yet a complete Russian retreat from the Caucasus would leave anarchy behind, which is in nobody’s interest.
Mr Putin can counter the dangerous trend towards competing for influence in the region by using his good offices now to broker a deal with Iran.
He cannot do it without American encouragement. Indeed he may have to convince his friend Mr Bush that US re-engagement is an essential part of the process. But he may be the one person who can still talk to both sides. He should exploit the opportunity and Mr Bush should welcome it.
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