Iran's Unhappy Ayatollahs

Meir Javedanfar, Ha'aretz:

On Saturday February 5, the administration of Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite its own predictions, found itself being referred to the Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear watchdog. On the surface the government is confident, and to show it, it is carrying out its threats of ending snap inspections by the IAEA.

However below the surface, all is not well. READ MORE

Major opposition is already being reported from the pragmatist camp in Iran, who despite their belief that Iran has a right to obtain nuclear energy for civilian use, feel that the Ahmadinejad camp is not being flexible enough in its dealings with the European Union. This camp, headed by Ayatollahs Rafsanjani and Karrubi, has also expressed major concern regarding Iran's economic capability to effectively withstand economic sanctions.

Iran's economic wellbeing aside, Rafsanjani most notably stands to lose millions of dollars worth of business if the West imposes economic sanctions on Iran, as Rafsanjani-owned companies are heavily involved in international trade. It is also reported that Rafsanjani has numerous international investments, stretching from Thailand to Canada.

Another common denominator in the united opposition of the two Ayatollahs, Rafsanjani and Karrubi, against Ahmadinejad stems from a personal grudge which they hold against him. Both Karrubi and Rafsanjani participated in the presidential race of 2005, and lost to Ahmadinejad, due to what they openly called "foul play" and "cheating." Their calls for investigation and recount of votes fell on deaf ears.

Rafsanjani, the more powerful and canny of the two, has already started to settle old scores with Ahmadinejad. He is a powerful opponent, who has a reputation for striking his enemies from behind the scenes in surprise attacks. This reputation over the years has earned him his popular nickname, "The Shark."

It is widely believed that Rafsanjani was behind the galvanisation of opposition in the Iranian Parliament, which culminated in the rejection of Ahmadinejad's first three nominated candidates for the position of oil minister. Rafsanjani's second instalment of blows against Ahmadinejad is on the way. It has been widely reported that Ahmadinejad's budget which has been submitted to the parliament for review, stands to be rejected by parliamentarians, due to pressure from private sector lobbyists, many of whom are close Rafsanjani allies.

Another chain of events, started by Rafsanjani on January 19, 2006 against Ahmadinejad should be of interest to the West. During a government visit to the city of Mashad, Rafsanjani suddenly cut his trip short and returned to Tehran for a meeting with Iran's supreme leader and old revolutionary comrade Ayatollah Khamenei. It is a known fact that Khamenei has tried to reduce Ahmadinejad's influence by giving Rafsanjani other senior political positions such as the presidency of the Expediency Council. Having a direct line to the supreme leader has meanwhile enabled Rafsanjani to lobby for more moderation in the nuclear negotiations with the West.

It is a saying in Iranian political circles that "if you want to bring real political change in Iran, either convince the army, or the clergy, or preferably both." Accordingly, on January 29, Rafsanjani went on a trip to the heart of Iran's religious establishment in the city of Qom, where he met 11 of Iran's 14 grand ayatollahs. This is a clear sign that Rafsanjani is looking for consensus for a major policy change. The change in question is apparently a six-point package of compromises to be offered to the West. This package according to a report in Iran's Keyhan newspaper includes concessions, such as accepting the so-called "Russia Plan," which would provide for uranium enrichment in Russia rather than Iran.

Over its 26-year history, Iran's government has managed to survive a U.S. embargo and the world's longest war against Iraq, by being pragmatic at crucial junctures. Despite the current bleak outlook, as recent events in Iran have shown, there is still a chance that pragmatists in Iran may score another victory.

Meir Javedanfar, an Israeli of Iranian descent, is a Middle East analyst at the Middle East Economic and Political Analysis Company.