Combating Iran's nuclear ambitions

Bennett Ramberg, San Diego Union-Tribune:

Once again, Tehran and its European interlocutors have backed off their collision course. The May 25 "last chance" talks between the revolutionary regime and the European Community recessed with little more than agreement to reconvene after Iran's June elections.

Britain, France and Germany (the EU-3) are now banking that a new Iranian president will do what President Khatami would nor or could not, namely halt the country's nuclear fuel cycle ambitions. Unfortunately the EU-3 hope is likely to be a chimera. Still, there remains an unexplored opportunity that can save face and enhance the security of all parties. READ MORE

The Iran-EU-3 negotiations began in the fall of 2003. They sprang from the European Union's conviction that diplomacy still could move Tehran from suspect activities despite its evident violation of international safeguards. A skeptical Washington agreed not to torpedo the EU-3 effort. However, the Bush administration put the negotiators on notice: failure to halt Iran's nuclear enrichment efforts would prompt the United States to put the matter before the Security Council. The administration further declared that it will not exclude any measure – including force – to prevent the mullahs from obtaining the bomb.

During months of on-and-off talks, the EU-3 offered a reasonable quid pro quo: Europe would provide Iran with dramatically improved economic and political relations in return for the cessation of nuclear fuel cycle activities. Throughout the dialogue, Tehran responded that it would be open to benefits but not at the cost of restricting peaceful nuclear enterprises, including the enrichment component.

However, the largesse of the planned venture – a fuel production capacity able to meet the needs of 10 reactors – calls the program's intentions into question. Consider: At this time Iran only has one power reactor under construction. Proposed plants will take a decades to build. Tehran's response – that its excess enrichment capacity could meet a global need – makes little sense in a glutted market.

A political angle may provide additional insight into the current impasse. The mullahs already have benefited domestically from the dispute. Despite significant disenchantment over unemployment, inflation, official corruption and religious strictures, the nuclear impasse has rallied the public. By refusing to bend to the demands of the West, the clerics will be in a better position to generate further political fidelity as the country approaches June elections.

But there is more that underlies the mullahs' position. Hubris sustained by malignant narcissism – feelings of insult, injury shame resulting in expressions of anger, hate, contempt and revenge – may fuel their cockiness. It appears to have contributed to Iran's repeated snubbing of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and recent demands that Europe contract with Iran to build ten reactors, that "coincidentally," would justify the enrichment program. Conceit also encourages the leadership to believe that it can block Security Council sanctions.

Impacting malignant narcissists is a difficult challenge. North Korea clearly marks a failure; Libya a success. In both cases the international community applied political and economic isolation to bring these countries to heel. But the results were quite different suggesting that there is no reliable key to sway countries.

Still, combating Iran's nuclear ambition would benefit from international solidarity. Unfortunately, neither Russia or China – both permanent members of the Security Council – are on board. A combination of important economic ties, skepticism about Tehran's nuclear weapons ambitions and a willingness to let Washington be the "heavy" explain. Then there is a European Community that continues to believe that pressing Iran too hard is counterproductive.

One solution: test Iran's "peaceful" representations. An EU-3 offer of an enrichment partnership on Iranian soil – however dubious economically – would serve this end. In exchange, Tehran would agree to "permanent" European operating and monitoring personnel coupled to enforcement of the 1997 additional protocol – which Tehran has yet to ratify – allowing International Atomic Energy Agency snap inspections of suspect nuclear sites. Violation of safeguards would result in the prompt application of specified significant penalties.

Such an action plan comports with Tehran's recent declaration that it is "100 percent flexible, open, ready to negotiate, to compromise ..." on any "mechanism" to prevent the diversion of nuclear fuels for weapons. Rejection of this partnership – a clear "compromise" that meets Iran's nuclear fuel requirements while tethering it to peaceful objectives – would raise a clear warning flag. The result would then serve to justify international action to halt the program through economic sanction, blockade and/or military action.

Ramberg served in the State Department during the administration of George H.W. Bush. He is the author of three books and editor of three others on international security.

Bennett's suggestion that in order to test Iran's intentions we should offer a "compromise solution", allowing the EU3 to partner with Iran to develop its uranium enrichemnt program, is serously flawed.

First, Iran has already offered this solution with the U.S. So it test nothing. But worse, this "solution" permits Iran to work out its nuclear technology problems with our help while permitting them to maintain a secret program elsewhere. In short, a very bad idea.